巴菲特致股东的信（2023年）⑥2023 年的成绩单

The Scorecard in 2023

2023 年的成绩单

Every quarter we issue a press release that reports our summarized operating earnings (or loss) in a manner similar to what is shown below. Here is the full-year compilation:

我们每个季度都会发布新闻稿，以类似下面的格式报告汇总的经营收益（或亏损）。以下是全年汇总：

At Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 6, 2023, I presented the first quarter’s results which had been released early that morning. I followed with a short summary of the outlook for the full year: (1) most of our non-insurance businesses faced lower earnings in 2023; (2) that decline would be cushioned by decent results at our two largest non-insurance businesses, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) which, combined, had accounted for more than 30% of operating earnings in 2022; (3) our investment income was certain to materially grow because the huge U.S. Treasury bill position held by Berkshire had finally begun to pay us far more than the pittance we had been receiving and (4) insurance would likely do well, both because its underwriting earnings are not correlated to earnings elsewhere in the economy and, beyond that, property-casualty insurance prices had strengthened.

在 2023 年 5 月 6 日的伯克希尔年度股东大会上，我展示了当天凌晨刚发布的一季度业绩，随后对全年做了简短展望：(1) 我们大部分非保险业务在 2023 年将面临利润下滑；(2) 两家最大的非保险业务——BNSF 铁路和伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源（"BHE"）的不错业绩将提供一定缓冲，这两家在 2022 年合计贡献了超过 30% 的经营收益；(3) 我们的投资收益肯定会大幅增长，因为伯克希尔持有的巨额美国国库券终于开始给我们比过去那点微薄利息多得多的回报；(4) 保险业务应该会表现良好，既因为承保收益与其他经济领域的收益不相关，也因为财产意外险的价格已经走强。

Insurance came through as expected. I erred, however, in my expectations for both BNSF and BHE. Let’s take a look at each.

保险业务符合预期。但我对 BNSF 和 BHE 的预期都犯了错。让我们逐一来看。

Rail is essential to America’s economic future. It is clearly the most efficient way – measured by cost, fuel usage and carbon intensity – of moving heavy materials to distant destinations. Trucking wins for short hauls, but many goods that Americans need must travel to customers many hundreds or even several thousands of miles away. The country can’t run without rail, and the industry’s capital needs will always be huge. Indeed, compared to most American businesses, railroads eat capital.

铁路对美国经济的未来至关重要。从成本、燃料消耗和碳排放强度来看，铁路显然是将重型货物运送到遥远目的地的最高效方式。短途运输卡车更胜一筹，但美国人需要的很多商品必须运输数百甚至数千英里才能到达客户手中。没有铁路，这个国家就运转不了，而且这个行业的资本需求永远是巨大的。事实上，跟大多数美国企业相比，铁路简直就是吞金兽。

BNSF is the largest of six major rail systems that blanket North America. Our railroad carries its 23,759 miles of main track, 99 tunnels, 13,495 bridges, 7,521 locomotives and assorted other fixed assets at $70 billion on its balance sheet. But my guess is that it would cost at least $500 billion to replicate those assets and decades to complete the job.

BNSF 是覆盖北美的六大铁路系统中最大的一个。我们的铁路在资产负债表上记录着 23,759 英里干线、99 条隧道、13,495 座桥梁、7,521 台机车以及各类其他固定资产，账面价值 700 亿美元。但我估计，要复制这些资产至少需要 5,000 亿美元和几十年时间。

BNSF must annually spend more than its depreciation charge to simply maintain its present level of business. This reality is bad for owners, whatever the industry in which they have invested, but it is particularly disadvantageous in capital-intensive industries.

BNSF 每年仅为了维持现有业务水平，资本支出就必须超过其折旧费用。不管你投的是什么行业，这对股东来说都不是好消息，在资本密集型行业中尤其不利。

At BNSF, the outlays in excess of GAAP depreciation charges since our purchase 14 years ago have totaled a staggering $22 billion or more than $11⁄2 billion annually. Ouch! That sort of gap means BNSF dividends paid to Berkshire, its owner, will regularly fall considerably short of BNSF’s reported earnings unless we regularly increase the railroad’s debt. And that we do not intend to do.

自 14 年前收购以来，BNSF 超出 GAAP 折旧费用的额外资本支出累计达到惊人的 220 亿美元，即每年超过 15 亿美元。唉！这种差距意味着，BNSF 付给其所有者伯克希尔的股息将持续大幅低于其公告的利润，除非我们不断增加铁路公司的债务。而那恰恰是我们不打算做的。

Consequently, Berkshire is receiving an acceptable return on its purchase price, though less than it might appear, and also a pittance on the replacement value of the property. That’s no surprise to me or Berkshire’s board of directors. It explains why we could buy BNSF in 2010 at a small fraction of its replacement value.

因此，相对于收购价格，伯克希尔获得的是一个可以接受的回报率，虽然没有看上去那么高，而且相对于资产的重置价值，回报少得可怜。这对我和伯克希尔董事会来说并不意外。这也解释了为什么 2010 年我们能以重置价值的一小部分就买下了 BNSF。

North America’s rail system moves huge quantities of coal, grain, autos, imported and exported goods, etc. one-way for long distances and those trips often create a revenue problem for back-hauls. Weather conditions are extreme and frequently hamper or even stymie the utilization of track, bridges and equipment. Flooding can be a nightmare. None of this is a surprise. While I sit in an always-comfortable office, railroading is an outdoor activity with many employees working under trying and sometimes dangerous conditions.

北美的铁路系统运送大量煤炭、谷物、汽车、进出口商品等，长距离单向运输，回程常常面临收入不足的问题。极端天气频繁出现，经常阻碍甚至完全中断铁轨、桥梁和设备的使用。洪水可能是一场噩梦。这些都在意料之中。当我坐在一直很舒适的办公室里时，铁路是一项户外工作，许许多多员工在艰苦、有时甚至危险的条件下作业。

An evolving problem is that a growing percentage of Americans are not looking for the difficult, and often lonely, employment conditions inherent in some rail operations. Engineers must deal with the fact that among an American population of 335 million, some forlorn or mentally-disturbed Americans are going to elect suicide by lying in front of a 100-car, extraordinarily heavy train that can’t be stopped in less than a mile or more. Would you like to be the helpless engineer? This trauma happens about once a day in North America; it is far more common in Europe and will always be with us.

一个日益加剧的问题是：越来越多的美国人不愿意接受铁路运营中固有的那种艰苦、往往孤独的工作环境。火车司机还要面对这样一个事实：在 3.35 亿美国人口中，一些绝望或精神失常的人会选择躺在一列 100 节车厢、极其沉重的火车前面自杀——而这种火车至少需要一英里以上才能停下来。你愿意当那个无能为力的火车司机吗？这种创痛在北美大约每天发生一次；在欧洲更为常见，而且永远不会消失。

Wage negotiations in the rail industry can end up in the hands of the President and Congress. Additionally, American railroads are required to carry many dangerous products every day that the industry would much rather avoid. The words “common carrier” define railroad responsibilities.

铁路行业的工资谈判最终可能由总统和国会来定夺。此外，美国铁路每天被要求运送大量它们宁愿避开的危险物品。"公共承运人"这个词就定义了铁路的责任。

Last year BNSF’s earnings declined more than I expected, as revenues fell. Though fuel costs also fell, wage increases, promulgated in Washington, were far beyond the country’s inflation goals. This differential may recur in future negotiations.

去年 BNSF 的利润下滑超出了我的预期，因为收入下降了。虽然燃料成本也降了，但由华盛顿发布的工资涨幅远超国家的通胀目标。这种差距在未来的谈判中可能还会重演。

Though BNSF carries more freight and spends more on capital expenditures than any of the five other major North American railroads, its profit margins have slipped relative to all five since our purchase. I believe that our vast service territory is second to none and that therefore our margin comparisons can and should improve.

尽管 BNSF 运送的货物量和资本支出都超过其他五大北美铁路中的任何一家，但自我们收购以来，它的利润率相对于这五家都有所下滑。我相信我们无与伦比的广阔服务区域意味着，我们的利润率对比能够而且应该改善。

I am particularly proud of both BNSF’s contribution to the country and the people who work in sub-zero outdoor jobs in North Dakota and Montana winters to keep America’s commercial arteries open. Railroads don’t get much attention when they are working but, were they unavailable, the void would be noticed immediately throughout America.

我特别为 BNSF 对国家的贡献感到自豪，也为那些在北达科他和蒙大拿的寒冬里顶着零下的严寒在户外工作、保持美国商业大动脉畅通的人们感到骄傲。铁路运行正常时，没什么人会注意到它；但一旦它不在了，全美各地会立刻感受到那个巨大的空缺。

A century from now, BNSF will continue to be a major asset of the country and of Berkshire. You can count on that.

一百年后，BNSF 仍将是这个国家和伯克希尔的重要资产。你们尽管放心。

Our second and even more severe earnings disappointment last year occurred at BHE. Most of its large electric-utility businesses, as well as its extensive gas pipelines, performed about as expected. But the regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of zero profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at California’s largest utility and a current threat in Hawaii). In such jurisdictions, it is difficult to project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among the most stable industries in America.

我们去年第二个、也是更严重的业绩失望来自 BHE。它旗下大部分大型电力公用事业和庞大的天然气管网业务表现都基本符合预期。但少数几个州的监管环境已经引发了零利润甚至破产的幽灵（加州最大的公用事业公司已经有了这个结果，夏威夷也面临同样的威胁）。在这样的辖区内，要预测一个曾被视为美国最稳定行业的利润和资产价值，变得困难重重。

For more than a century, electric utilities raised huge sums to finance their growth through a state-by-state promise of a fixed return on equity (sometimes with a small bonus for superior performance). With this approach, massive investments were made for capacity that would likely be required a few years down the road. That forward-looking regulation reflected the reality that utilities build generating and transmission assets that often take many years to construct. BHE’s extensive multi-state transmission project in the West was initiated in 2006 and remains some years from completion. Eventually, it will serve 10 states comprising 30% of the acreage in the continental United States.

一百多年来，电力公用事业通过各州逐个承诺固定的股本回报率（有时还对卓越表现额外奖励），募集了巨额资金来支持增长。通过这种模式，大量投资被提前投入到未来几年可能需要的产能建设中。这种前瞻性的监管反映了一个现实：公用事业建设发电和输电资产往往需要很多年才能完工。BHE 在西部的大型跨州输电项目始于 2006 年，至今还要好几年才能完成。最终它将服务于 10 个州，覆盖美国大陆面积的 30%。

With this model employed by both private and public-power systems, the lights stayed on, even if population growth or industrial demand exceeded expectations. The “margin of safety” approach seemed sensible to regulators, investors and the public. Now, the fixed-but-satisfactory- return pact has been broken in a few states, and investors are becoming apprehensive that such ruptures may spread. Climate change adds to their worries. Underground transmission may be required but who, a few decades ago, wanted to pay the staggering costs for such construction?

在公私电力系统都采用这种模式的情况下，即使人口增长或工业需求超出预期，灯也始终亮着。对监管者、投资者和公众来说，这种"安全边际"方法看起来是合理的。然而现在，这种固定但令人满意的回报约定在少数几个州被打破了，投资者开始担心这种破裂会蔓延。气候变化更加重了他们的忧虑。地下输电线路也许是必要的，但几十年前谁愿意为那惊人的建设成本买单呢？

At Berkshire, we have made a best estimate for the amount of losses that have occurred. These costs arose from forest fires, whose frequency and intensity have increased – and will likely continue to increase – if convective storms become more frequent.

在伯克希尔，我们已经对已发生的损失做出了最佳估计。这些损失源于森林火灾——如果对流风暴变得更频繁，火灾的频率和强度已经在增加，而且很可能继续增加。

It will be many years until we know the final tally from BHE’s forest-fire losses and can intelligently make decisions about the desirability of future investments in vulnerable western states. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory environment will change elsewhere.

要彻底算清 BHE 森林火灾损失的最终账单，并据此明智地决定是否继续在脆弱的西部各州投资，还需要很多年。至于监管环境在其他地方是否会发生变化，尚待观察。

Whatever the case at Berkshire, the final result for the utility industry may be ominous: Certain utilities might no longer attract the savings of American citizens and will be forced to adopt the public-power model. Nebraska made this choice in the 1930s and there are many public-power operations throughout the country. Eventually, voters, taxpayers and users will decide which model they prefer.

不管伯克希尔的情况如何，电力行业的最终结局可能都不乐观：某些公用事业可能不再能吸引美国公民的储蓄，将被迫转向公共电力模式。内布拉斯加在 1930 年代做出了这个选择，全国各地也有很多公共电力运营商。最终，选民、纳税人和用户将决定他们更喜欢哪种模式。

When the dust settles, America’s power needs and the consequent capital expenditure will be staggering. I did not anticipate or even consider the adverse developments in regulatory returns and, along with Berkshire’s two partners at BHE, I made a costly mistake in not doing so.

当一切尘埃落定时，美国的电力需求和由此带来的资本支出将是惊人的。我没有预料到、甚至没有考虑过监管回报方面的不利变化，我和 BHE 的两位合伙人为此付出了高昂的代价。

Enough about problems: Our insurance business performed exceptionally well last year, setting records in sales, float and underwriting profits. Property-casualty insurance (“P/C”) provides the core of Berkshire’s well-being and growth. We have been in the business for 57 years and despite our nearly 5,000-fold increase in volume – from $17 million to $83 billion – we have much room to grow.

问题说得够多了。我们的保险业务去年表现出色，在销售额、浮存金和承保利润方面都创了纪录。财产意外险（"P/C"）是伯克希尔繁荣和增长的核心。我们已经在这个行业经营了 57 年，虽然规模从 1,700 万美元增长到 830 亿美元，增长了近 5,000 倍，但仍有很大的增长空间。

Beyond that, we have learned – too often, painfully – a good deal about what types of insurance business and what sort of people to avoid. The most important lesson is that our underwriters can be thin, fat, male, female, young, old, foreign or domestic. But they can’t be optimists at the office, however desirable that quality may generally be in life.

除此之外，我们还学到了——往往是痛苦地学到的——大量关于什么类型的保险业务和什么样的人应该远离的经验。最重要的教训是：我们的承保人可以是瘦的、胖的、男的、女的、年轻的、年长的、外国的或本国的。但他们在办公室里不能是乐观主义者，尽管乐观通常是生活中可取的品质。

Surprises in the P/C business – which can occur decades after six-month or one-year policies have expired – are almost always negative. The industry’s accounting is designed to recognize this reality, but estimation mistakes can be huge. And when charlatans are involved, detection is often both slow and costly. Berkshire will always attempt to be accurate in its estimates of future loss payments but inflation – both monetary and the “legal” variety – is a wild card.

财产意外险的意外——可能在半年或一年期保单到期后几十年才冒出来——几乎总是负面的。这个行业的会计准则就是为这一现实而设计的，但估算误差可能非常大。而当骗子卷入其中时，发现真相往往既缓慢又昂贵。伯克希尔将始终力求准确估计未来的赔付金额，但通货膨胀——货币的和"法律"的——是一张未知的牌。

I’ve told the story of our insurance operations so many times that I will simply direct newcomers to page 18. Here, I will only repeat that our position would not be what it is if Ajit Jain had not joined Berkshire in 1986. Before that lucky day – aside from an almost unbelievably wonderful experience with GEICO that began early in 1951 and will never end – I was largely wandering in the wilderness, as I struggled to build our insurance operation.

保险业务的故事我已经讲了太多次了，新来的股东请直接去看年报第 18 页。在这里我只想重复一句：如果不是阿吉特·贾恩（Ajit Jain）在 1986 年加入伯克希尔，我们不可能有今天的地位。在那个幸运的日子到来之前——除了从 1951 年初开始与盖可保险（GEICO）那段几乎令人难以置信的美妙缘分（这段缘分将永远延续）——我基本上一直在荒野中摸索，苦苦经营着保险业务。

Ajit’s achievements since joining Berkshire have been supported by a large cast of hugely-talented insurance executives in our various P/C operations. Their names and faces are unknown to most of the press and the public. Berkshire’s lineup of managers, however, is to P/C insurance what Cooperstown’s honorees are to baseball.

阿吉特加入伯克希尔后取得的成就，离不开我们旗下各类财产意外险业务中一大群才华出众的保险高管的支持。他们的名字和面孔不为大多数媒体和公众所知。但伯克希尔的经理人阵容之于财产意外险行业，就好比棒球名人堂的入选者之于棒球运动。

Bertie, you can feel good about the fact that you own a piece of an incredible P/C operation that now operates worldwide with unmatched financial resources, reputation and talent. It carried the day in 2023.

伯蒂，你可以为自己拥有这样一份了不起的财险业务而自豪——它如今在全球运营，拥有无与伦比的财务资源、声誉和人才。它在 2023 年大放异彩。